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 Most philosophers adopt an etiological conception of functions, but not one that uniformly explains the functions attributed to material entities irrespective of whether they are natural or man-made.  Here, I investigate the widespread idea that a combination of the two current etiological theories, SEL and INT, can offer a satisfactory account of the proper functions of both organisms and artifacts. (Roughly, SEL equates a function with a selected effect and INT with an intentional content). Making explicit what a realist theory of function supposes, I first show that SEL offers a realist theory of biological functions in which these are objective properties of a peculiar sort. I argue next that an artifact function demonstrates the same objective nature as a biological function when it is accounted for by SEL, but not when it is accounted for by INT. I explain why a dual theory of artifact functions admitting both INT and SEL functions is to be dismissed. I establish that neither INT nor SEL alone can account for all artifact functions. Drawing the conclusion that we need a new etiological theory of function, I show how one can overcome the apparent inevitability of INT for some artifact functions. Finally, I outline a new etiological theory of functions that applies equally to biological entities and to artifacts. 

1. Introduction 
Presently, there are two major etiological theories of function, the selectionist one (SEL) and the intentionalist one (INT).​[1]​ Both theories deserve the label "etiological", which is associated with the theory Larry Wright propounded in the 1970s, because they take up Wright's thesis that attributing a function to an X may serve to explain its aetiology. In other words, the function of X tells us why X exists now or why it is to be found in a particular location.​[2]​ Etiological theories of function have become very popular in the last 30 years because they account for that which is specific to functions. Not only do etiological theories explain the role that functions may play in etiological explanations, they also offer a straightforward account of the teleological meaning and the normative import that many functional attributions have. In fact, sentences of the form "X has function F" are often understood as meaning that X is there in order to do F. As for the normative import, it shows in the distinction between properly functioning items (those that can fulfill the function attributed to them) and malfunctioning ones (those that cannot). By identifying functions with historical properties, etiological theories make it possible to separate the possession of the function from the possession of the corresponding capacity. Two items may both have function F, because they have the same relation to some historical fact (or series of historical facts), yet differ physically, so that one may possess the capacity to do F while the other one does not. This offers a satisfactory interpretation of the difference between a properly functioning item and a malfunctioning one. Furthermore, it gives a certain content to the idea that an X is there in order to do F; X is there because history has associated Xs with doing F.​[3]​
According to SEL, saying that X has function F amounts to saying that X is there because previous Xs have been selected for having done or produced F. A classical example in the literature is that of hearts having the function of circulating blood. It is because previous hearts have been selected for circulating blood that present hearts actually have the function of circulating blood (and not the one of producing a rhythmic sound).  Although SEL was devised primarily to explain biological functions, it can also apply to artifact functions, as many authors have pointed out.​[4]​ In the first case, it is natural selection that is at work, in the second case,  it is some sort of cultural selection. 
INT concerns only artifacts. It is supposed to account for their proper functions. The proper function of an item is the one attached to it as a member of a particular artifact type. It is different from the occasional uses to which an  object may be put, such as when a pencil is used as a hairpin.​[5]​  INT identifies the proper function of an artifact with a specific intention. Roughly, to say that artifact X has function F means, according to INT, that whoever created X or put X in some specific location did so thinking that X would do F.​[6]​  An object will have, for example, the function of slicing potatoes if whoever designed it did so for that purpose. In the last thirty years, the great majority of the literature on functions has concerned biological functions. When artifact functions were considered, it was usually en passant. If some form of SEL was not supposed to account for them, it was then taken for granted that the job would be done by INT.​[7]​ Recently, functions of technological artifacts have been investigated for their own sake by what may be called the Dutch school in philosophy of technology.​[8]​ The new and interesting insights that have resulted from this research don’t change radically the situation, since the principle that artifact functions depend on intentions has not really been challenged. To be more specific, two members of this Dutch school, Vermaas and Houkes have presented a new theory, ICE (Intentionalist, Causal Role, Evolutionist), which is much more elaborate than the basic and classical INT. However, ICE still gives the decisive role to the designer’s intention.​[9]​ As a consequence, my criticisms against INT will also be directed towards ICE as far as ICE is meant as a genuine theory of function. ​[10]​
At present, whoever wants to account in an etiological spirit for all the proper functions of material entities is faced with three possibilities : to adopt SEL for all of them (possibility n°1); or to adopt a dual theory consisting of SEL plus INT in either one of two possible forms. Either SEL accounts for all the biological functions and INT for all the artifact ones (possibility n°2) or SEL accounts for all the biological functions and a part of the artifact functions, while INT accounts for the remaining part of artifact functions (possibility n°3).​[11]​ I will argue that none of these three possibilities is acceptable. N°1 and n°2 have to be dismissed because neither SEL nor INT alone can account for all artifact functions. This will be shown in the course of the argument against possibility n°3, which is the most challenging option and the one on which I will focus.  Interestingly, some of the arguments against possibility n°2 will show that the usual separation between biological functions and artifact functions is quite arbitrary.
I will demonstrate the difficulties that a dual theory like n°3 encounters by focusing on INT. I will argue that INT implies a determinate anti-realism about functions and that this anti-realism is highly problematic because (1) it results in an untenable ontological duality since SEL is a realist theory; (2) it goes against the implicit conception of function that is revealed in our current use of the term.
My aim in this article will be to show that: 
1.	An etiological theory of function needs to be realist all the way through (for biological as well as for all artifact proper functions);
2.	INT, despite its broad acceptance, is not a satisfactory theory for any sort of artifact proper function, no matter what version of INT we consider; 
3.	It is possible to understand the conditions an etiological theory has to fulfill in a way that does not make INT mandatory for any artifact proper function;
4.	It is possible to devise an etiological theory that accounts homogeneously for all proper functions of material entities. I sketch it at the very end of the article.
2. Realism about functions
 In what does a realist conception of functions consist? To answer this, it is useful to reflect upon the range of existing positions. At one extremity, one finds the Hempelian thesis that functions are fictitious properties, like witches or medieval humours are fictitious entities.​[12]​ According to Hempel, functional discourse is just a heuristic tool. So, all functional expressions must eventually be eliminated from our scientific theories (of course, this does not concern the mathematical homonym). In some usages, these expressions should be replaced by unproblematic ones, such as "necessary condition", and in others they should just be eliminated without being replaced by anything specific.​[13]​ At the other extreme, one finds SEL which considers functions as a special sort of property whose distinctive character consists in resulting from selective mechanisms. Biological functions, as SEL analyses them, are properties of the same nature as other perfectly legitimate biological properties, such as the property of being an adaptation. Such properties are objective properties that can rightfully figure in a scientific theory.
In between these two extremes, one finds the systemic theory (SYS), which is the major challenger to etiological theories.​[14]​ According to Cummins, who propounded SYS in 1975, functions concern parts in a system. The function of a part X is simply the capacity (or disposition) by virtue of which X contributes to the functioning of the system under consideration. X has function F thus means: X has the disposition to do F and it is by doing F that X, a part of system S, contributes to what S is doing. So, according to Cummins, functions typically name physical dispositions.​[15]​ Now, physical dispositions are commonly admitted to be legitimate properties. So, Cummins' functions are not, in this sense, fictitious properties. However, the use of the term "function" suggests that there are two sorts of physical dispositions :  functional ones and non functional ones. Yet, this difference is imaginary. It is merely one of perspective, it depends on what the theorist decides to consider as a system. So, in the end, functions constitute no particular subcategory of properties. Science can totally dispense with functions and replace them by the corresponding physical dispositions. This is why the etiologists usually see SYS as a non realist theory of functions. SYS doesn’t recognize that something like fully-fledged functions exist. It replaces functions by simpler properties that can ground neither an etiological assertion nor a normative one. On the contrary, philosophers more favorable to Cummins' approach, judge SYS to be a realist theory since, unlike Hempel's, Cummins identifies functions with perfectly legitimate properties, physical dispositions.
At this point, I can make precise what I mean by a realist theory of functions. A realist theory of functions is one according to which functions are properties that are (1) not fictitious, (2) not replaceable by a simpler sort of property and (3) objective. (1) and (2) have similar consequences: if (1) or (2) is not fulfilled, then functional sentences are specious; they deceptively support  unwarranted etiological and normative inferences. So, a well-formulated scientific theory should admit functions only if (1) and (2) are fulfilled. (3) is also a condition required for admitting functions in science. Perhaps with the exception of some branches of psychology, scientific discourse accepts only objective properties, i.e. properties whose instantiation can be assessed by intersubjective means. Furthermore, as we will see in what follows, (3) also reflects the legitimacy conditions associated with the uses of "function" in everyday life.​[16]​ Now, we are in position to determine precisely where SEL and INT stand relative to this realist/anti-realist opposition.
  When applied to biological functions, SEL is realist. As we will see, it satisfies (1), (2) and (3). Up to the end of this section, our concern will be exclusively with SEL within the biological domain. It is clear that the biological functions SEL accounts for are objective and not fictitious. They are objective historical properties of features (or of organs). A function is a past effect of a feature that has helped those who bore the feature to survive longer or to reproduce more than those not bearing it. So, (1) and (3) are fulfilled by SEL straightforwardly. (2) raises the more difficult question of reducibility. Function F refers, according to SEL, to past facts (to past items that have done F), so it cannot be identified with a current physical disposition to do F as in SYS. But other reductions might be available. It could well be that selective properties are reducible to a vast complex of past physical dispositions. If so, does the reducibility issue really mark a difference between SEL and SYS, since it cannot be shown a priori that selective properties are irreducible to physical dispositions?
Yes, it does. The decisive point is not whether something is reducible to something else, but whether the equivalents delivered by the reduction retain the salient aspects of the reduced elements and preserve their specificity. SYS denies reality to functions because the reduction it proposes implies the elimination of all that is supposed to be peculiar to functions. SEL, on the contrary, grants functions their peculiar features. In fact, the historical properties SEL proposes as equivalents of functions can support the etiological and normative sense of functional assertions. SEL, in itself, does not exclude the possibility of a further reduction. It leaves the question open, but it puts an important condition on reductions. Whoever adopts SEL should be willing to accept a further reduction in which the selective properties would be equated with physical dispositions only if it retained the peculiar features of functions. If ever such a reduction occurred, function F would be equivalent to a complex of physical properties and dispositions that would, no doubt, be very different from the simple physical disposition to do F. The specificity of functions would not disappear. In all likelihood, such complexes would be distinguishable from other sorts of complexes of physical dispositions and also from simple physical dispositions. In conclusion, SEL respects (2) because it excludes the possibility that functions could be replaced by simpler properties, i.e. properties failing to support the etiological and normative assertions that functions support. 
Now, we can turn our attention to artifacts and to how INT and SEL apply to them. First, I will make more explicit the distinction between objective and subjective properties that is involved here in order to show in sections 4 and 5 that functions of artifacts that are accounted for by SEL prove to be objective properties.
3. A criterion to distinguish subjective and objective properties.
	Many functions appear to be subjective. An object’s function might vary in accordance with different people’s perspectives.  Consider a seascape painting  that three people who share an office have agreed to hang. The artwork may have a different function for each of them: for Mary, it has the function of making her daydream; for John, the function of distracting his attention from a dirty spot on the wall nearby; for Judith the one of reminding her of last year’s beach holiday. Each of the office mates had a different intention when agreeing to hang the picture on the wall and each of them has different thoughts when looking at it. This is apparently enough to determine three different functions. But not all functions whose existence depends on human activity and intentions appear to be as subjective as these. Even if cars exist and are to be found in the streets because people have wanted such objects to exist and to be put in the streets, the proper function of Mary’s car does not depend on what she thinks when she looks at it. So, we need to make more precise what we mean by a subjective property, and we need to determine when a relational property that depends in some way or other on intentions is subjective.​[17]​
To be an object of remembrance and to be the father of somebody are two relational properties, the possible instantiations of which depend on intentions (at least we expect that in most cases it does). However, they are not equally subjective. To be a remembrance will be our paradigm of a subjective relational property. What characterizes this kind of relational property is the fact that the dependence on intentions is such that a modification of these may change the property, all others things remaining equal. What was an object of remembrance for X in his youth may not be so any more, now that he is old and has a failing memory. A function will count as a subjective property only if it shows this kind of direct dependence on an intentional content. What other kinds of dependence on human desires and beliefs may exist that allow for objective functions? Let us first consider a biological case.
Imagine that some plant produces a new organic covering that serves to protect it against an insecticide, such as DDT. Imagine also that this situation results from the intention some agents have had to make the soil these plants live in suitable for cultivation. The occurrence of the function depends on the intentions and actions of the people who cultivated this soil, but nevertheless it does not appear to be subjective. Let us see what we obtain when applying SEL. According to SEL, as we have seen, a function refers to the relation a trait has to a determinate series of historical facts, the ones which explain its current presence, i.e. its selection or its maintenance. Some elements of the causal history leading to the current trait’s presence will, accordingly, figure in the characterization of its function. Which ones? Those that are strictly needed to explain selection and maintenance: the favorable effect and the elements of the past environment that have made it selectively advantageous. For example, let us suppose some animal species has a type of thick skin that can serve both for thermal insulation and for filtering a high level of UV radiation. The function of this thick skin will be thermal insulation, if the animals that possessed it survived and reproduced better than the ones that didn’t because they suffered less from cold. Conversely, the function will be insulation from high UV radiation if what advantaged the first group of animals was that they suffered fewer cancers as a result of high levels of UV radiation. Depending on whether the function is thermal insulation or protection from a high level of UV radiation, the temperature or the amount of UV radiation in the past environment of the species will be involved in characterizing the function. The other elements of the causal story will not make a difference when it comes to determining the function of the thick skin.  While some events, processes or states of affairs may have played a decisive causal role in the development and maintenance of such a thick skin, the function of the thick skin does not depend as directly on them as it depends on the past temperatures or on the past levels of UV radiation. Indeed, any possible history that shares the pertinent part of the actual history would ground exactly the same function. Thick skin would be endowed with the function of thermal insulation through any history in which animals with thick skin survived and reproduced better than those with thin skin because the former were protected better against the cold. 
Let’s return to our example of a new organic covering protecting the plant from DDT. Here, the intentions and the actions of the agents who have created the situation by introducing DDT in the soil are, in fact, left out when one applies SEL. They belong only to the causal background. To characterize the covering’s function one has to refer only to the concrete situation produced by the intentional agents - the fact that the soil contained DDT - and nothing more, because the favorable effect is just to protect from DDT. As this example shows, it does not matter whether or not intentions play or have played some decisive causal role in producing the functional feature. Functions may not depend directly on intentions even if these are at the origin of the functional feature.
To analyze more complex cases, i.e. cases which are not biological, we need a simple means to draw the line between subjective and objective properties. We can extract from our previous discussion a simple criterion based on thought experiments (i.e. on counterfactual tests). If the function attributed to an entity changes in accordance with the thought one supposes the relevant subject (or the relevant group of subjects) to possess, all other things remaining equal, then it is of the subjective sort: it depends directly on intentions. If, on the contrary, it remains unaffected by such changes in the subject’s thoughts, it is of the objective sort. According to this criterion, the property of being a remembrance is, as it should be, a subjective property. Depending on the thoughts we attribute to Andy, some object Andy has in his office drawer will be or will not be an object of remembrance. If Andy keeps this object, let us say a tin soldier, because it reminds him of having played with it or with similar tin soldiers,  it is an object of remembrance well enough. However, if Andy thinks this tin soldier means nothing to him but should be kept because the person to whom it belonged and who left it there may ask for it one day,  then it is not an object of remembrance.
Let us check now whether this criterion also delivers the right answer when applied to the new plant’s organic covering. Protecting the plant from DDT will remain the function of the new organic covering, whatever thoughts we attribute to the people responsible for spreading DDT. To imagine that the people who spread DDT did it in order to please some God (DDT being seen as an object of offering), in order to obtain a variety of the plant resistant to DDT thanks to the production of a new covering, or in order to eradicate the plant from the soil because it hampered the cultivation of another plant does not change a thing since the elements that define the function remain exactly the same.
4. Applying the criterion to functions determined socio-culturally
Intentions usually play a bigger role for artifact functions than in our example of the organic covering. In this case, the selection pressure - to survive and reproduce in a context where there is DDT - could be described without any reference to intentions. However, intentions cannot be left out so easily from the selective history when considering artifacts. Let us consider cigarette holders, and for the sake of simplicity, let us take cigarette holders without any sort of filter. They have essentially a social function: making their bearers look sophisticated. Looking sophisticated is a social fact which depends mostly on intentional phenomena. Essentially, the selective pressure relative to this particular function calls into play the ideas people have formed about what it means to look sophisticated in what circumstances. Now, if we apply our criterion to this function, what does it indicate ? It indicates that it is nonetheless objective. There is no relevant subject or group of subjects whose thought content determines directly what function cigarette holders have.​[18]​
A possible relevant subject whose thoughts might matter in fixing the function of the artifact is the inventor, another one the producer, and still another one the distributor. If we imagine any of them to have had whatever idea we want about the function of the cigarette holder, that idea is of no consequence as long as it does not relevantly modify what happened at a public level. All other things being equal, their beliefs and intentions make no difference to the cigarette holder’s function. If one of them or all of them thought that the distribution of the cigarette holder would mostly be limited to manual workers because they would have good use for it - better and cleaner handling of cigarettes with dirty hands or work gloves - and so would become a symbol of the working class, the function of the cigarette holders remains exactly what it is -  a sign of sophistication .
To make more plausible the supposition of a change of intentions in the relevant agents with no change in the public facts determining the function, we can imagine the following scenario. The inventor was a manual worker and a smoker, who imagined such a device because she saw how useful it would be for her at work. She convinced a producer to make the device she had invented, and once they found a distributor, all three saw it as a handy device for manual workers. But the advertising agent they contacted chose lovely and sexy women to represent the workers using such a device and, in the end, probably because of the glamorous look of the pseudo-nurses appearing in the advertisements, the device became associated to sophistication and was essentially used with evening dresses at parties and only very seldom with working clothes in places like factories or hospitals. (One can imagine the same advertisement campaign with the three protagonists thinking, on the contrary, of the cigarette-holder as a means for looking sophisticated.)​[19]​
Are we not too restrictive in limiting the relevant subjects to inventors, producers or distributors? Shouldn't we consider some larger group of people? Only with respect to these three sorts of professionals does it appear meaningful to ask whether subjects may fix an object's function by thinking it to be designed for this or that. In fact, only subjects with these social positions have ever been envisaged as possible function-fixers by the philosophers defending some version or other of INT for artifact proper functions. The question has been raised mostly about inventors, whether they be inventors of new artifacts or inventors of a new use for an old artifact. Only those who have planned beforehand to produce or distribute an object for a specific purpose, are in a position to establish a direct relationship between their thought and a function's determination. By including other subjects one can indeed see how thought may interact with a function's determination, but the relation then is only an indirect one; it does not support a subjectivist interpretation of function. Let us be a little more precise about this indirect relationship.
If we consider all the people pertaining to the context in which cigarette holders are produced, distributed, sold and used, then, of course, it matters what they think it is made for. If everyone thought of this very object as an acoustic device, it would not have the function it has. But, then, this would show in many behaviors: instead of smoking with it, people would put it in their ears in determinate acoustic circumstances; they would decide to buy it when wanting or needing some sort of acoustic device; etc. This may not be sufficient to make it an acoustic device, but it is sufficient to make it something other than a cigarette holder.​[20]​ So the thoughts people entertain about an artifact indeed play a decisive role, but the role these thoughts have is through the behaviors they cause - what one does and what one says. The behaviors contribute to the making of a general context, a socio-cultural one. This context exerts a selective pressure on the production and distribution of artifacts such as cigarette-holders. It is on this socio-cultural context that the proper function of an artifact, its typical use, directly depends, not on ideas in minds. Besides, the fact that socio-cultural contexts depend to a large extent on what people think does not make them any less objective than more natural contexts, such as the ecological niches of animal species. In fact, socio-cultural facts and contexts are objects that sociologists and historians study with no problem using standard scientific methods.
So far the application of our criterion has delivered nothing very surprising. As long as one can identify some selection process similar to natural selection, one can apply SEL, and the functions so analyzed prove to be objective relational properties. The function of X, as analyzed by SEL, refers to publicly selected effects. Previous Xs have been used publicly in some determinate way and thereby have had definite effects. It is these past usages and these past effects that explain the existence of the current Xs and their being associated with a typical use. So, the application of SEL delivers the same realist picture whether it applies to biological functions or to artifact ones. With regard to functions, cultural selection is on a continuum with natural selection. 
Not only does SEL apply well to many artifact functions, for many of them, it appears to be the best possible account. Even in the many cases where the publicly recognized function is exactly the one that was thought of by the inventors, it seems preferable to adopt a SEL account rather than an INT one (suppose for the time being that INT accounts are admissible). One reason for this is coherence in accounting for a change of function. As a matter of fact, one usually needs to bring in SEL in order to explain a change of function. To take Beth Preston’s example, when something invented as a pipe cleaner and used for a while as a pipe cleaner gradually becomes used for home crafts, only SEL can account for the second function because there is no inventor’s intention or the like that could be referred to. Now, if the second function is accounted for by SEL, it seems SEL should also account for the first. If the socio-cultural context is sufficient to fix the function in case n°2, it is also sufficient to fix it in case n°1. Moreover, the gradual change of function can be explained by a gradual change in the socio-cultural context, but not by a discrete change of status. It can not be explained by a jump from being an INT function to becoming a SEL function.​[21]​ 
What is more, such cases show that Possibility n°2 (INT for all artifact function) must be rejected. Many artifact functions cannot indeed be accounted for by INT. Among these are not only functions resulting from a gradual change in public use, as we have just seen, but also functions coming from a long history of unconscious improvements. For example, a determinate form of hammer’s handle can have the function of the making the hammer well-equilibrated and easy to hold, but it may be that nobody never really calculated and planned this form. It may be that a series of small modifications from the first rough exemplars in the Paleolithic ages have been gradually selected without anyone ever planning consciously the ergonomic resulting form. However, if SEL can offer a good account for many artifact functions, it cannot for all of them.
5. The problem raised by new artifacts
There are at least two types of cases which cannot fit into the general scheme of natural or cultural selection:
a) the first generation of a new type of artifact
b) an artifact which is unique
A fundamental condition for applying SEL is missing : there are no previous items on which selection could have operated relative to the functional effect under examination.​[22]​
One could question the suppositions of novelty and uniqueness just made. There are no clear discontinuities enabling us to distinguish modifications or improvements within one type from the creation of a new type. What will determine whether a new spaceship made to reach Mars should be seen as a slightly modified exemplar of  the previous spaceships that were made to reach the moon or as initiating a new type? There is no principle for answering such a question. The notion of a type (or to use a Millikanian notion, the idea of a reproductive family) is much more vague when artifacts are concerned than when organisms are.​[23]​ However, even if there is no precise boundary between improvement and novelty, we do in fact distinguish the two, and consider that some artifact functions qualify without ambiguity as new. So the question remains of determining what it is that these supposedly new functions name. If the fuzziness of the distinction between sheer modifications and real novelties does not dissolve the "problem of new artifacts", however, it casts doubt on the current supposition that one can divide easily  functions resulting from socio-cultural processes from functions resulting from planning and design. This point will be revisited below. 
The attribution of a function to a new artifact has a peculiar feature that seems to force an INT analysis on us. We usually make such attributions by relying on what those who have conceived the artifact say about it. Say Jane is a designer who has conceived a new device.  When someone asks Jane what the device’s function is, most likely he will accept her answer. If no socio-cultural selection has taken place and if the function attributed to X is exactly the one given to it by its designer, then it seems that the function of X cannot but refer to what the designer thought X was for. However, this inference is too quick. One should not jump from the premise that no socio-cultural selection has taken place to the conclusion that no objective selection of any sort took place and that SEL, in whatever form, cannot be applied.
Maybe there have been prototypes produced in the research period, and the function that Jane attributed to some part she designed, E, relies not on what she planned, but on empirical experience. Suppose nobody planned that this part should reduce vibrations, but in testing different prototypes it was discovered that some prototypes fared better than others, and these were the ones that vibrated less. Suppose, then, that it was further found out that the prototypes that vibrated less were the ones with element E (instead of E',E"... ) in place P (we can assume that the plan left some degrees of freedom about what should be in P). In such a case, the basis for attributing to E the function of reducing vibrations is the selection of E (against E',E"...) for its favorable effect through an experimental setting, not an explicit intention Jane had concerning E when designing the artifact. A current supposition until now has been that the separation between selective artifact functions (functions resulting from some sort of objective mechanism of selection) and intentional ones (functions resulting from explicit intentions of the designers) is clear enough. The underlying assumption is that distinction depends on whether or not there has been some sort of socio-cultural selection. But the previous example shows that the distinction is not so clear. The use of prototypes in tests could be seen as an analogue of natural selection. As a matter of fact, it is not difficult to apply SEL in this case, and to equate E’s function with an objective property: the favorable effect for which prototypes having E have been selected over variants (with E',E'', ...instead of E) in experimental context C. 
However, there are probably a lot of cases where no such selection of prototypes ever took place. Moreover, there are cases for which prototype selection is simply impossible. For instance, considering spaceships, one cannot test and observe in real conditions prototypes of devices planned to do something at a temperature exceeding the one that can be produced on earth. So even if SEL can account for more functions than we realized until now, the conclusion remains that SEL is not sufficient to cover the whole domain of the proper functions of material entities. However, the fact that there might be objective SEL functions where no one was expecting them teaches us something. It shows how improbable a simple and clear separation between "SEL functions" and "INT functions" is. This becomes clearer still if one envisages not a simple device, such as a potato slicer but some really complex artifact, such as a spaceship. The planning of a spaceship is an utterly complex process including many phases and loops, where many skills are put into use. At the end of this complex design process, whoever would try to determine the source of the functions attributed to the different parts and features would probably arrive at the following description: some have been invented at the table, others result from testing prototypes, others still come from importation by incorporating already largely employed and tested artifacts, not to mention computers running evolutionary algorithms which add a further complication (is running an evolutionary algorithm a form of experimental testing, a form of intellectual reasoning or something in between the two?).
So, if SEL and INT are the only options available, the domain of the proper functions of material entities appears quite gerrymandered if not completely confused. SEL and INT functions seem to mix more or less everywhere. One can find no clear border separating the domain or SEL functions from the one of INT functions. For this reason, INT and SEL functions should be ontologically similar. INT should identify functions with the same sort of  relational property with which SEL identifies them.​[24]​ In particular, since SEL equates functions with objective properties, INT should do the same. Does it? This is the question I investigate in the following section.
6. Are INT functions objective or subjective ?
The definition of function as put forward in classical INT analysis is the following: 
The (first) function of X is what the designer, when realizing her project, has thought X to be meant for.​[25]​
This definition reduces functions to subjective properties. In fact, using our criterion, the function will change if we suppose that, all other things remaining equal, the designer's thought is different. Anyhow, as it has been acknowledged, such a definition has serious flaws. Following it, any crazy function some crazy inventor would endow her invented object with should be admitted as genuine. But, if somebody makes a strange object out of an old motorbike, and declares that its function is to control the thoughts of the people nearby, we won't take her word for it. In fact, the situation described earlier, in which one believes as true the answer one obtains, needs to be filled in with restrictive conditions. This is the case only when we have good reasons to think that what we are told is rational and well grounded. Engineers of a well-respected firm, accredited members of institutional research laboratories, user manuals edited by good companies, all these are reliable sources we trust.
Thus, it appears that the definition of function should at least be modified so as to be restricted to cases of rational thinking.​[26]​ With such a modification one obtains indeed a good characterisation of attributions of function to new artifacts, a characterization which conforms well to the attributions we are ready to make. However, these restrictions don't change the situation in relation to the objective/subjective distinction. So defined, functions would still be subjective properties, admittedly of a peculiar sort. They would be properties related only to rational thinking. This can be established once again by using our criterion: if more than one rational attribution of function is possible, which is often the case,​[27]​ then the function of X could be changed simply by supposing a change in the designer’s mind. Had she thought on a good rational basis to put element X there to perform G instead of thinking, on a good rational basis, to put element X there to do F, the function of X would be to do G and not F.
Yet, performing other thought experiments, we see that when we attribute a function to an artifact we pretend to attribute to it an objective property, not a subjective one, whether or not our attribution is constrained by rationality. Suppose, for example, you believed like every one else that X had function F, for example to cool some part should it reach a definite temperature, because this was what some scientific theory implied. Suppose, further, that this theory is refuted and it appears that X could never have done that. Will we still say that X has function F because that is the function the designer of X gave it on a rational basis? Certainly not. This, I believe, is sufficient to show that a function cannot be equivalent to the rational functional attribution made by the designer at the end of his planning activity. It would certainly be possible to add some further condition to rule out this kind of counter-example, but I don’t think this is a good strategy. The difficulty lies, it seems to me, in the very idea that a proper function could depend directly on mental content.
To be rational and well-founded are epistemic properties, i.e. properties relative to theories and knowledge, independently of what is the case. We can think that Ptolemaic astronomy was perfectly rational and well-founded considering knowledge in ancient times, and yet judge it to be absolutely false. Can proper functions be epistemic properties and depend on rational knowledge rather than on what is the case? Functions corresponding to epistemic properties would satisfy the following condition: if according to culture C, X has function F on a rational basis, then X has function F. But functions are not culture-dependent in this way. Imagine, for example, a tribe whose theory is that solid things go under liquid ones which again go under airy ones. Suppose that to make a piece of wood or cork sink these people attach to it a piece of lead that they have designed for this use. Suppose further that their explanation is that lead acts as a repellent for the airy parts which otherwise go inside the small holes that the wood and cork have. Let us add that they attribute explicitly to the pieces of lead they have manufactured the function to purify solids by repelling the air that otherwise would go in the small holes of the solid. Will we endorse their functional attribution, repelling air, since it is a rational one ? No, we will not. 
It may happen that an ethnologist or someone else who adopts our physics enunciates sentences that look like endorsements. Mary, a good ethnologist and physicist, might indeed say, "theses lead pieces have the function to repel air". The reason for this is that such sentences are ambiguous. They can be meant non literally. You may not believe in lucky charms and still say "this is a lucky charm," meaning not that the object indicated brings luck or has the function of bringing luck, but that the people who had it thought that it did. For you, if this object has indeed a function, it is not to bring luck but to make superstitious people feel better. The way to test whether the enunciated sentence is meant literally or not is to imagine a dialog with a naive person, a child for example. Suppose Mary’s child asks her after having heard her speaking of the repelling function of the pieces of lead, "could I use one of them to repel the air that is in my mattress?" Mary’s answer would probably run more or less like this : "Oh, they don’t really have this function. Some people think they do but, in fact, they don’t. Their function is rather to make the things they are attached to become heavier and that’s how they make pieces of wood or cork sink in water" (one will not speak of Archimedes’ principle or of specific gravity to a young child). We will not endorse the statement that some lead pieces have an air-repelling function unless we admit that at least sometimes some of them may have the capacity to repel air. 
The conclusion I draw from these two thought experiments is that to have a certain function F, an artifact X must have some objective property making it probable or at least possible that it will have effect F in the right circumstances. It is not sufficient that there has been an attribution of function by the right kind of person (the designer or the producer), even if this attribution fulfils various conditions of rationality.​[28]​ So INT, classical or refined, is false. This conclusion, however, raises a new question: how are functions and function attributions related?
In other words, how can a theory such as Vermaas and Houkes’ ICE deliver a satisfactory theory of function attribution but a quite unsatisfactory definition of function? The answer is simply that the attribution concerns epistemological conditions (what it is rational to suppose, admit or judge according to our knowledge, our technical means and the practical situation we are in) whereas the definition is concerned with ontological conditions (what the thing is like). Now, epistemological conditions and ontological ones can be quite different. The ontological condition for being gold is, we suppose, to have a certain atomic number, but the conditions for being rationally justified in thinking that something is gold are quite different. These can be: seeing it labeled as gold in a jewelry shop; being told it is gold by a chemist; verifying it is yellow, malleable and melting at k° in a determinate experimental setting; etc. The epistemological conditions depend heavily on the situation. They will not be the same for a customer buying jewels, a jeweler buying jewels, a trade-expert on metals or a chemist in his laboratory.
 Of course, all epistemological conditions are not on equal footing. Those that correspond to expert knowledge deserve more consideration than others. Experts are called on when the best possible judgment is wanted. For gold, an expert is a chemist; for a new artifact function, an expert is an engineer involved in the designing process, etc. When there is an ontological hypothesis about what the thing is, the expert’s judgment has to be coherent with this hypothesis, given the means at his disposal. Given our technical means and the ontological condition of having atomic number 79, it would be incoherent that appearing a determinate yellow be the epistemological criterion for the chemist. But coherence does not imply mirroring. Atomic number 79 can be the ontological condition even if the epistemological situation is rudimentary (no electronic microscope, etc.) and the best means at disposal to identify gold is a series of chemical tests such as the substance’s reaction to heating or to being put in contact with mercury. Moreover, it is not even necessary to have a determinate ontological hypothesis to be able to distinguish between the two sorts of conditions.
So, if the conditions of a rational attribution of function have to be taken into consideration when investigating what functions are, they should however not be taken as a guide. The conditions for a rational attribution of function can be quite different from the ontological conditions fixing what a function is. This fact has two important consequences. One is that an ontological theory of function may well leave room for different conditions of rational attributions of function depending on the domain. In particular, even if conditions for rationally attributing functions to organisms differ greatly from those for rationally attributing functions to newly made artifacts, the ontological condition for being a function may be the same in both cases. Another consequence is that the situation can be much more intricate at the epistemological level than at the ontological one. So, the intricacy of the different sort of conditions for functional attributions does not prove that the notion of function refers to a jumble that should be eliminated or sorted out (a conclusion reminding of Hempel's). And, contra Cummins, it does not prove either that functional attributions designate something rather basic, such as physical dispositions, dressed in fancy functional clothes. This intricacy may result from varying epistemological conditions within a single domain. Various epistemological conditions attached to one ontological condition can indeed explain epistemological similarities that cross domains' boundaries. Indeed, there is nothing to be surprised at if engineers testing prototypes reason like evolutionary biologists or if biologists use reverse engineering techniques.
8. Is a realist etiological theory of artifact functions possible ?
I draw one negative and one positive conclusion from the previous analysis: (a) the dual etiological theory must be rejected, (b) since no artifact function is subjective, one should account for all artifact functions with a realist etiological theory. More generally, I think we should aim at a unitary realist etiological theory that applies to biological functions as well as to all artifact ones. Some of the arguments presented here militate for such an unitary theory, there are still others that I have presented in other papers.​[29]​ However, everyone wanting to go down that particular road faces immediately a serious difficulty. It seems at first sight impossible to give an etiological account of the functions of newly invented artifacts.
The etiological approach requires that the "expected effect" of Xs, i.e. its function, intervene in the causal chain that produces Xs. This sort of circular dependency between the existence of Xs and the capacity to do F can be achieved by a selection mechanism, as SEL demonstrates well. However, no similar circular dependency can obtain for a first generation of artifacts. The capacity of Xs to do F cannot have had any causal action in producing the first generation of Xs, since no X existed before. The only possible story seems to be that the cause of the first generation of Xs was someone thinking that the Xs would have the capacity to do F. Thus, an intentionalist theory appears mandatory in this case. And, this explains why INT has been so widely accepted. However, we have seen that grounding functions on intentional content rather than on objective facts, as INT does, has the unwanted consequence of turning them into subjective properties. For a realist etiological theory of function to work for a first generation of artifacts, the cause of the existence of the Xs must be a relation between F and Xs that is in the external world and not only in the mental world of some individual.
Can we 	avoid having to choose between functions grounded either on an objective selection mechanism, or on an intentional content? It seems to me we can. We must just emphasize how much of invention is discovery. The idea that Xs will often enough do F in some set of circumstances may, when true (or true enough), be interpreted as a simple detection of an objective fact. Often, indeed, the thinking intermediary is made to disappear when objective facts are concerned. For instance, we simply say the cathedral of Strasbourg is 142m high when we think that this common opinion is true. We make the intermediate thought manifest only when we discover errors. Then, we say something like "People  once thought that the Strasbourg cathedral was 142m high". We favor objective relations over epistemic ones. In a somewhat similar manner, the thought that Xs will do F in circumstances C can be left out of the function picture. It can be seen simply as one of the steps through which the real relation between something’s being of type X and being (sometimes or often) capable of doing F has given rise to the existence of Xs. No X need exist for someone to detect the objective relation between the Xs and the capacity to do F. 
In fact, an etiological theory need not indicate some event in the causal chain leading to the Xs. What is required is an O such that "X is there because of O". Now, this does not imply that O should be a past event or a past state of affair. Nothing forbids O to be a timeless property – as is the timeless relation existing between the type X and the capacity to do F. So, the story may read somewhat like this: some intentional agent, let’s say Andrea, who wanted something able to do F, decided to make Xs when she found out about O. In this case, O is indeed in an etiological relation to the Xs – the Xs are there because of O - it is just that O is not a material cause, but a reason. Such a description of the situation is moreover quite commonplace. For instance, let us suppose Andrea made a sharp edged instrument thinking it would help her obtain the sort of holes she wants in felt pieces. Let us suppose also that what she thought was more or less correct; in most circumstances her instrument in fact has this capacity. Then, we could indeed say that such an instrument was made because of its capacity to cut holes of a certain sort in felt pieces, without mentioning the role of Andrea’s thoughts and intentions in producing the instrument. This solution to the problem of newly created artifacts needs to be substantiated, but it is contrary neither to good sense nor to our current thinking and speaking habits.
A unitary etiological theory of functions in outline
Larry Wright thought of his etiological theory of functions as ranging over a vast domain, going way beyond that of biological functions. My project of a unitary theory for biological and artifact functions is reminiscent of this aspect of his theory, even if it is not as broad as his was. I don’t want to account for the conscious functions that he considered at the end of his 1973 article. The somewhat similar ambition explains another common feature between my tentative characterization, which I present below, and his own definition: the mechanisms producing the functions do not show up. Wright’s definition of functions is more abstract than the ones propounded by defenders of SEL or INT.​[30]​ SEL’s and INT’s definitions eliminate the drawbacks of Wright’s definition by restricting the domain of application and by introducing a specific mechanism, the one supposed to produce the typical functions of the domain under consideration. For biological items, this mechanism is natural selection. For artifacts, it is conscious planning. However, my account differs greatly from Wright’s in many respects.
Let us consider first, his definition of function. Over and above the technical flaws that doomed it from the start, it does not give a sufficient support to the so-called "forward-looking” aspect of functions.​[31]​ It is the same for the SEL definitions that came after it, with one significant exception, the propensity version of SEL elaborated by Pargetter and Bigelow. Of course, the etiological aspect of a classical SEL definition, which says that present Xs are there because previous Xs have done F, gives a good basis for inferences of the following sort: if some or most previous Xs were able to do F in some sort of circumstances or other, then some or most present Xs should be able to do so, too. Yet, it is one thing to offer the basis for inferring A, when the right sort of information is available (many traits are hereditary through genetic transmission, past and present environments are similar in pertinent features, and so on ...), but quite another thing to consider A as part of the definition of function. Function attributions are used heavily to give information about what is to be expected from some object or some feature. We name artifacts mostly after their function - potato peeler, hair dryer, coffee-machine, etc. Our practical interests justify this naming practice; our concern is mostly with what the things are supposed to do, not with precisely what their make-up is. It is for their supposed capacities that we usually buy and keep artifacts. With organs too, the accent is on function rather than on physical make-up. Not much attention is paid to physical differences among organs when those difference do not affect the fulfillment of their function(s). For this reason, a characterization of functions that would include both an etiological aspect – why there are such things as Xs – and a forward looking one – the capacities to do F of the present Xs – would be more satisfactory than a purely etiological one .
Even if Wright did not put any particular mechanism in his definition of function, he contended that any function of whatever sort resulted from selection in one form or another. If it did not result from an objective selection in the world, then it resulted from a mental selection in the mind.​[32]​ The idea that conscious selection could be taken as a source of functions has been aptly criticized by Mitchell.​[33]​ The main reason to reject it is simply that such "conscious functions" would be totally subjective. The function attributed by the crazy inventor would then really be a function. If functions are objective properties, as I claim they are, selection cannot be the source of all of them. Yet there is another way to maintain Wright’s idea that for every function the consequences must have played a decisive role in producing the functional items.​[34]​ It can be done, as I have suggested, by isolating the part of discovery in invention. In this way, the consequences or the effects can play roles as reasons even if they don’t play roles as material causes.
I cannot justify here the new characterization of function that I have begun to explore and that I will give now in order to show that the critical analysis presented here does not lead to a dead end, but opens a new line of investigation. Let us quickly consider some of its salient features. Its most surprising one will certainly be, for an etiologist at least, the introduction of probability. To be specific, it introduces the probability that an item has to function properly, i.e. the probability it has of having the capacity to do F in the right circumstances. Thanks to this incorporation of probability, the forward-looking aspect of functions is taken into account. Moreover, incorporating probability makes the characterization really substantial, and that helps understand why functions are so pervasive in scientific descriptions and explanations. For now, I have, for the most part, explored what the probability of being non-defective, that is of having the capacity to do F, refers to.​[35]​ My objective has been to show that the introduction of this probability has a solid ground and is in no way a technical trick. Such probability is in fact rooted in what makes the type considered not an arbitrarily defined class, but a real kind. 
The introduction of the notion of "real kind" is the other novelty that our characterization brings in. Biological species are real kinds, but real kinds include other sorts of classes of type. Real kinds comprise kinds whose unity is  rooted in physical or historical causes. They include physical natural kinds, as are, for example, gold or water, but also the less well-known historical and homeostatic kinds of Ruth Millikan and Richard Boyd. Biological species as well as many current artifact types are such historical real kinds. They are kinds whose members share a common destiny because they depend equally on a series of common historical causes and mechanisms (heredity by genetic transmission, natural selection, cultural selection, common design, common manufacturing procedures, and so one).​[36]​ 
As a last remark, let us explain why I aim at a characterization, which is more modest than a fully-fledged definition of function. The difference between a characterization and a definition is the following : a definition gives a necessary and sufficient condition while a characterization delivers only a necessary one. To obtain only a necessary condition is unsatisfactory when the condition is evident and not very substantial. It delivers then little information if any at all. However, when the necessary condition is substantial and opposes present alternative definitions, the characterization is quite informative. I don’t aim at a proper definition because I suspect that the sufficient condition will involve pragmatic elements without great significance. Whenever a regular connection between the members of some type X and some effect F can be explained by applying classical laws of nature, it should of course be explained this way. Attribution of functions and functional explanation are useful only when they are unavoidable, that is, when the regularity cannot be explained simply by resorting to the natural laws of physics or chemistry. As a matter of fact, one objection to classical SEL definitions has been that they apply to unwanted cases, for example to some effect of crystals, even though we have never called such an effect a function and are quite reluctant to do so.​[37]​ 
Such objections are serious only for a conceptualist project whose aim is to clarify what we mean. The conceptualist has to give an explicit definition of the notion under scrutiny, a definition that reflects its actual conditions of use. As far as I am concerned, however, the main task of the theory of function is not to grasp the notion as a purely mental or conceptual entity, but as a notion that  refers to some real feature in the world. Definitions and characterizations seen in this perspective are not meant simply to clarify our thoughts or ways of talking, but also to elucidate what the thing referred to is like. I need not argue here for this understanding of much of the conceptual labor of  philosophers and scientists (certainly a good example of it is when biologists discuss what a species is), others have already done it.​[38]​ Given my preference for an ontological clarification (what a function is) over a psycho-semantic clarification (what our present representations and conceptions of functions are), a characterization is good enough as long as it tells us what the specific features of functions are that make referring to functions a necessary means for describing and explaining a significant part of reality.
As a conclusion, let me give the tentative characterization of function that I am aiming to explore further:
Item I has function F only if :
1. I is a member of the real kind X;
2. X’s members have probability p to do F as the result of the common causal ground that makes them be members of X;
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^1	  We take here a relatively abstract stance since there are different versions of SEL and INT. 
^2	  SEL comes directly from the theory of function propounded by Larry Wright in 1973. This explains, in part, why what we call here "the selectionist theory" is often simply called "the etiological theory". There are actually several historical reasons to this identification of the etiological character with the selectionist one. First, the selectionist theories propounded by Millikan and Neander solved some serious difficulties the initial theory of Wright encountered. In particular, they offered the means to make a clear distinction  between types and tokens, the absence of which resulted in a very problematic circular relation between cause and effect in Wright’s original definition of function. Second, the focus has been mostly on biological functions where only SEL is needed. For a synthetic presentation of the history of the etiological theories of function, see the introduction of Buller in Buller 1999, pp.1-27 or Godfrey-Smith 1993.
^3	  For simplicity sake, we call Xs both the entities that are supposed to do F and those that possess a specific feature that is supposed to do F. It is a way to treat simultaneously cases where a function is attributed to a type of entity (hearts having the function to pump blood) and where it is attributed to a feature possessed by a type of entity (being vividly colored has the function of making peacocks or peacock’s tails attractive to peahens). In the second case, "Xs" will then need to be replaced by a complex phrase like "in peacocks, the feature of having a tail which is vividly colored".
^4	  See, for instance, Millikan 1984, Chap.1; Bigelow & Pargetter 1987 §III, Griffiths 1993 §8.
^5	  Biological functions are, in fact, proper functions, functions attached to a type of organ or organic part.
^6	  For a survey and for a general but self-contained discussion of the major INT theories sustained in the second half of the 20th century, cf. McLaughlin 2001, chap. III.
^7	   See, for example, Bigelow and Pargetter 1987, §III and Neander 1991, 462.
^8	  See the website of "The Dual Nature of Technological Artifacts" project (http://www.dualnature.tudelft.nl).
^9	  See Vermaas & Houkes, 2003.
^10	  Recently, Vermaas and Houkes have stressed that ICE should rather be understood as an epistemological theory of rational functional attribution rather than as a proper (ontological) theory of functions. See Vermaas & Houkes, 2006. 
^11	  Possibility N°4 (to account for all functions by INT) supposes to embrace a theological perspective as in modern ages.
^12	  To be fictitious and to be reducible are quite different things. « To be a lucky charm » is fictitious (in a good theory of the world nothing will be equivalent to this property), but "to have a determinate weight" is by no means fictitious, it is just reducible by definition to mass and attraction. Hempel did not use expressions like "fictitious properties", but they help summing up his position.
^13	  Cf. Hempel 1965.
^14	  Cummins' theory is not considered here as a possible option because we share the judgment of many philosophers that it does not and cannot account satisfactorily for the normative and teleological aspects of functional attributions. We refer to it now just in order to make more precise what requirements a realist theory of function must meet.
^15	  A physical disposition is a disposition which results from the physical properties of the item considered. The interest of a functional analysis is indeed for Cummins to offer a reduction to some lower level, the bottom levels being physical ones (See Cummins1973, §III.4).
^16	  The expression "legitimacy conditions" indicates that the decisive point is not so much how we may in fact use a word as how we intend to use it. The fact that Bill had called a sheep a dog says less of what he thought "dog" might mean than the fact that he wanted to correct his previous statement when he saw better the animal and heard it bleat.
^17	  In order to avoid confusion, let us indicate that the functions of the hanged picture should be analyzed as use functions and not as proper functions. In fact, it is doubtful whether pictures have an artifact function, i.e. a definite proper function. One may indeed want to rephrase our question as follows : up to which point are artifact functions similar to this sort of  use functions?
^18	  For simplicity's sake, I will consider a single subject when the difference between the singular case and the collective one is irrelevant.
^19	  One can raise the objection that my example does not concern the "primary function", viz. to hold cigarettes, but some social secondary function. The same thought experiment can be carried out about primary functions and it will deliver the same verdict. One could, for example, modify in that perspective a nice illustration of function change given by Beth Preston, that of the pipe cleaner that acquired the function of home crafts or toys for children <Preston 1998, 241>. One can imagine the object planned once as a pipe cleaner and once as a toy resulting in the same public situation: it came into use as a toy and not as a pipe cleaner. This could be possible by imagining in the two cases the same, not very clear, advertisement campaign where a grand father is shown smoking the pipe and surrounded with children and where the device is represented as a funny being that twists itself in all manners.
^20	  We will show later on that it is, in fact, not sufficient. 
^21	  See also Longy 200?.
^22	  See Vermaas & Houkes, 2003, 265-6.
^23	  Cf Lewens 2004 for a clear analysis of how the absence of an heredity mechanism affects the determination of types in the artifact case. <Chap. VII, in particular p. 141 sq.>
^24	  See Longy 2007b et 200? for a more substantial justification.
^25	  Cf. McLaughlin 2001, 50-53.
^26	   Vermaas and Houkes require that the designer's attribution be justified, which amounts to the same. See 2003.
^27	  We have seen that simple devices like cigarette holders can be attributed different functions rationally. Of course, this may seem much more difficult with complex artifacts. What other function could be attributed to an Airbus A320 than being a plane? However, this does not speak against the general conclusion obtained considering more simple cases. It shows only that rational inferences might be very constrained when considering complex artifacts. But the possibility of more than one rational attribution exists also with highly technical artifacts. One can imagine, for example, a kind of plastic, specially planned to make lighter wings, that could also have been thought of for making water evacuation easier and quicker for wings in case of rain because of its low deformability.
^28	  What is tricky with artifact functions is the fact that the designer's intention often seems to make all the difference between different possible functions. Two designers can conceive the same object for different purposes and the two objects will normally not have the same function. One will have, let us suppose, the function of regulating the flow in some system, the other the function of eliminating some unwanted by-products in another system. But then this difference will show objectively: the two objects will appear in different places or situations. Functions are relational properties implying contextual elements. So it is to be expected that changing the context would change the function. It is the same with biological items: the tissue that has the function of filtering xyz in the kidneys might well serve a different function in the lungs. The difference between the natural case and the artifact one lies simply in the fact that the designer's by its action can determine in part the context. 
^29	  See Longy 2007b & 200?
^30	  See Lorne, this volume
^31	  For a little more precision on the technical flaws, see above note 2.
^32	  See Wright 73, 50 (in Buller)
^33	  See Mitchel 1989, 218 sq.
^34	  Wright writes for example : "'Why is it there?' in some contexts, and 'What does it do?' in most, unpack into 'What consequences does it have that account for its being there?'." 73, 49 (in Buller). 
^35	  See Longy 2006 et 2007a
^36	  See Boyd 1989 & 91 and Millikan 99.
^37	  See Bedau 1991.
^38	  See among many others, Boyd 91, 141.
